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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Comment on Recent Decisions
ACCESSION AND CONFUSION-INNOCENT COMMINGLING-RIGHTS OF OWN-
Ms.-In an action of replevin to recover the increase of certain cows owned by
plaintiff, running in a large herd under the control of the defendant where
all calves had been branded with the same brand and hence were indis-
tinguishable, held the owner could not recover in replevin because he was
unable to identify the calves. Hagan v. Cosper (Ariz. 1930) 292 Pac. 1020.
The legal presumption is that the confusion was caused by unavoidable
accident or mistake. Fraud or negligence, to enter the case, must be
pleaded and proved. Franklin v. Gumersell (1881) 9 Mo. App. 84; Wright
v. Ellwood Irvins Tube Co. (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1904) 128 F. 462; Ayre v.
Hizon (1908) 53 Ore. 19, 98 Pac. 515.
In cases of innocent confusion it is universally held that both the com-
minglor and the other owner have rights in the goods or their value. Or-
dinarily the comminglor has the property and the other owner is trying to
get his proportionate share. The latter may take physical possession of his
portion wherever he can find it, if he can do so without breach of the peace.
Ryder v. Hathaway (1838) 21 Pick. (Mass.) 298; Gates v. Rifle Boom Co.
(1888) 70 Mich. 309, 38 N. W. 248. In some jurisdictions the owner is de-
nied the right to recover his property in kind by legal means, upon the
principle that the claimant in replevin must identify his goods-an impos-
sibility in a case of true confusion. Gray v. Parker (1866) 38 Mo. 160;
Ames v. Mississippi Boom Co. (1863) 8 Minn. 467; Hull v. Hull (1871) 1
Idaho 361. Gray v. Parker, above, probably does not represent the present
doctrine of the Missouri courts, which would now allow an action of re-
plevin if the property is similar in quality and value and is separable.
Kaufmann v. Schilling (1874) 58 Mo. 218; Blurton v. Hansen (1909) 135
Mo. App. 548, 116 S. W. 474. This is the prevailing view. Keweenaw
Ass'n Ltd. v. O'Niel (1899) 120 Mich. 240, 79 N. W. 183; Rust Land &
Lumber Co. v. Isom (1902) 79 Ark. 99, 66 S. W. 434; Page v. Jones (1920)
26 N. M. 195, 258 Pac. 274; Dalton v. Bilbo (1927) 126 Okla. 129, 258 Pac.
274. To enable the owner to maintain trover against the comminglor, many
courts require some act of conversion other than the confusion. Martin v.
Mason (1886) 78 Me. 452, 7 Atl. 11; Cronberg Brothers v. Johnson (1922)
29 Wyo. 11, 208 Pac. 446. The modern trend is to treat the mere confusion
as sufficient. Rabe v. Jourdan (1907) 46 Tex. Civ. App. 456, 102 S. W.
1167; Samuel v. Holbrook, Cabot, & Rollins Corp. (1913) 156 App. Div.
485, 141 N. Y. S. 275. An action of general assumpsit will not lie [Pratt
v. Bryant (1848) 20 Vt. 333]; but equity will grant an accounting. Hobbs
v. Monarch Refrigerating Co. (1912) 277 Ill. 326, 115 N. E. 534.
If the other owner should take more than his share by peaceable recap-
tion, the comminglor has an action of trespass against him. Ryder v.
Hathaway, above. If the whole lot of goods is seized under an execution
against either party, the other has a right of action against the sheriff if
the latter refuses to surrender a proportionate share on demand. Bowen v.
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Sanborn (1861) 1 Allen (Mass.) 389; Servel v. Corbett (Idaho 1930) 290
Pac. 200. But in Missouri the injured owner cannot maintain a statutory
interplea in an attachment unless he can identify the goods. Kelly-Good-
fellow Shoe Co. v. Sally (1905) 114 Mo. App. 222, 89 S. W. 889.
In relatively few cases courts have treated the former owners as ten-
ants in common of the whole mass. Davis v. Krum (1882) 12 Mo. App,
279; First National Bank of Rogers v. Tribble (1922) 155 Ark. 264, 244
S. W. 33. This seems to be the prevailing rule in England. Sandemen &
Sons v. Tyzack & Branfoot Steamship Co. Ltd. (1913) A. C. 680; Spence v.
Union Marine Insurance (1868) L. R. 3 C. P. 427. It is submitted that the
analogy is not perfect as tenancies in common normally arise through the
consent of the tenants. Where a statute exists, as in Missouri, for the
partition of tenancies in common of personalty at the request of either
party, calling the relationship a tenancy in common would make little dif-
ference if the other owner was vigilant to protect his rights. R. S. Mo.
(1929) secs. 1606-1608.
The decision in the case under review is unduly technical, for range cat-
tle in a single herd are necessarily closely similar in quality and value and
the action of replevin under the Codes was designed to give the claimant a
way to recover property in specie when he wished and could do so without
injuring the defendant. G. W. S., '33.
CImIINiAL LAw-PUNISHMENT-BANISHENT.-Defendant, convicted of
a violation of the liquor law, was fined and sentenced to leave the State
of Michigan within thirty days and not return for a period of five years.
Held, the sentence was unauthorized and contrary to public policy. Peo-
ple v. Baum, (Mich. 1930) 231 N. W. 95.
Very few cases of banishment by state courts have arisen. This type
of punishment, so frequently resorted to at common law, seems to have
been considered only by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in State
v. Baker (1900) 58 S. C. 111, 36 S. E. 501, holding that a sentence of per-
petual banishment from the state may not be imposed.
Banishment, which was first known in England as "adjuration," where
a party accused fled to sanctuary, confessed his crime, and took an oath
to leave the kingdom and not return without permission, was not consid-
ered at that time as a punishment, but as a conditional pardon. 4 BLA.
CoM. 333. It was well recognized at common law; and banishment as
a condition of pardon has been sustained in the United States. People v.
Potter (1895) 1 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 47.
Banishment is not a cruel or unusual punishment, and does not con-
stitute a violation of the guaranty against cruel and unusual punish-
ments. Legarda v. Valdez, 1 Philippine 146. The Michigan court in the
instant case did not place its decision on constitutional grounds but pointed
out that this method of punishment was not authorized by statute and
was contrary to public policy. To sustain its view of public policy the
court says, " . . . to permit one state to dump its convict criminals into
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